

FMECA in Action



ENGINEERS
AUSTRALIA
Newcastle Division



ASSET MANAGEMENT COUNCIL
Newcastle Chapter

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EnergyAustraliaTM
We're on it

Overview - Asset base

- \$36 billion Network assets
- Consisting of
 - 4,700 km of sub-transmission voltage conductors
 - 17,000 km of high voltage conductors
 - 28,000 km of low voltage conductors.
 - More than 230 Zone and transmission Substations
 - More than 29,000 distribution substations.
 - More than 550,000 poles
 - Approximately 250,000 street lights

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


How did Energy Australia's Asset Management framework mature?

- "Our maintenance is broken, I want you to fix it"
- FMECA / RCM methodology adopted
- FMECA / RCM and Regulatory framework drove the need for information
- Maintenance needs evolved into asset management
 - Defect reporting linked to analysis
 - Maintenance cannot fix it if it's the wrong asset for the business
 - Development of asset tools and economic models requiring both technical and financial information
 - iAMS

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Why Do FMECA?

- The basic approach of regulation is:

Where the network operator can show that in it's circumstances the work is justified, it must be allowed to recover the efficient cost of performing the work.

- So how does FMECA help?

What is FMECA?

- **Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis – a Structured analysis process for:**
 - Identification of equipment/system functions
 - Identification of functional failures
 - Identification of Failure Modes
 - Identification of the effects of the failure
 - Assessing criticality of the failure
- **Uses**
 - Elimination of undesirable failure modes during design
 - Input to RCM Analysis
 - Input to asset condition risk assessment
 - Input into asset safety assessment

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What is RCM?

Reliability Centred Maintenance

- An analysis process centred on achieving inherent levels of equipment safety and reliability at minimum cost.
- History:
 - Original reliability work conducted (1945)
 - Logic process first defined by United Airlines (1965)
 - Expanded to support the Boeing 747 program (1972)
 - Adapted by Royal Australian Air Force (1975)
 - Seminal RCM document by Nowlan and Heap for DoD (1978)
 - Adapted from RAAF to the Victorian rail industry (1986)
 - Now accepted practice across all commercial industry
 - Latest success with Energy Australia (2000-2008)

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RCM analysis

- Asks seven questions
 - What assets are **important** to the business?
 - What is the asset's **function(s)**? **FMECA**
 - How does it **fail to perform** that function?
 - Why **causes it to fail**?
 - What **happens** when it fails?
 - How can that failure be **managed**?
 - What can be done if the **failure cannot be managed**?


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RCM analysis

- Selects maintenance tasks from five possible options
 - **examines** items to detect potential failures
 - **restores** items before a maximum age
 - **discards** items before a maximum age
 - **checks** items to find failures that are not evident
 - **applies default tasks** of “run to failure” or “redesign”
- The TMP is the sum of the above tasks for each asset that are **applicable and effective** in managing the effects of failures.


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FMECA/RCM model (maintenance)




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FMECA/RCM



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FMECA/RCM



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FMECA/RCM

The screenshot shows a software interface for FMECA/RCM analysis. On the left, a tree view displays a hierarchy of equipment and functions, including:

- AF/CLC Pans
- CBD 120kV Cable Tunnel
- CTs and VTs
- DC Power Systems
- EA Protection Equipment
 - PR 11 01 00 GEC Relay type CDG
 - To interface to other parts of the protection scheme.
 - To provide an insulation level greater than 15mg ohm between frame, AI
 - To provide continuity of CT secondary circuit.
 - To provide initiation of the trip sequence.
 - To provide instantaneous overcurrent protection.
 - To provide inverse time overcurrent circuit protection.
 - Calibration test shot outside 5% of expected time.
 - Induction Disc
 - fast rotation
 - weak break magnet
 - Normal
 - slow rotation
 - defective jewel bearing
 - Normal
 - incorrectly adjusted break magnet
 - Normal

On the right, the **MRA - MODE** window is open, showing details for a specific failure mode:

- System:** EA Protection
- Equipment:** PR 11 01 00 GEC Relay type CDG
- Function:** To provide inverse time overcurrent circuit protection.
- Function Failure:** Calibration test shot outside 5% of expected time.
- Part Description:** Induction Disc
- Failure Description:** slow rotation
- Failure Cause:** defective jewel bearing
- Op Mode:** Normal
- Local Effect:** Failure of protection to
- Design:** MRA


The MRA window includes a **Design** tab with various analysis options:

- Criticality & Task Assess:** Failure Critically (N), Evident Failure (N), Safety Impact (Y), Environment Impact (Y), Operation Impacts (Y), Proposed Task (N.S.M.)
- Primary Fail:** Lube / Service (N), On Condition (N), Restoration (N), Discard (N)
- Protective Fail:** Combination (N), Failure Finding (Y), Redesign (N), No Scheduled Maintenance (N)
- Examination:** Examination (N)
- Task:** Task (N)
- Other:** Other (N)
- Approval:** Approval (N)

The **Decision Basis** is: Failure finding analysed offline. Optimum band starts at 3285.


The **Zoom** window shows: Arcing damage to the interposer. Back-up protection will operate. Loss of supply.

FMECA/RCM



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How does this all fit?



What has been the result?

- 380 New maintenance standards were produced for 99% of the electrical network assets in 4 years.
- Some maintenance periods have been increased and some decreased.
- Reduced rates of 'in service' failures
- Inspection task backlogs reduced by 98.4 % over 3 years
- Mature Opex / Capex tradeoff approach
- Solid framework for maintenance requirements reviews

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FMECA in OPEX

Regulatory Outcomes

- 1999-2009
 - Increased funding for System OPEX as the need for the work was clearly and objectively articulated
- 2009-14
 - System OPEX funding sustained
- Why?

Robust methodology which provides greater transparency to the Australian Energy Regulator

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FMECA in CAPEX

- Energy Australia's capital programme of the 2009-14 period is \$8bn of which approx 50% is replacement
- Capital Programme **doubles again from 2004-9** including:
 - 50 new Zone/STS substations
 - Retire 40 Zone/STS substations
 - Replacement of 132kV oil cables – **141km**
 - Replacement of 33kV cables – **155km**
 - Significant replacement of aged 11kV switchgear
 - **1263 panels**
- So where does FMECA Fit?

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Replacement Strategy

- Our Operations Investment Managers monitor the failure rates and modes on our assets and identify assets which have emerging issues.
- We also monitor the asset performance via specialist committees which draw subject matter experts from the business to review incidents and raise issues
- An investigation is initiated via the replacement manager
- Improved data enables us to move from an age surrogate to an actual condition and risk based combined approach.

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Replacement Subprograms

- Risk Assessment Report
 - The assets are identified
 - Risks associated with the asset and its environment are reviewed
 - A sample of assets and sites are visited and a risk assessment worksheet developed
 - The risk assessment worksheet is reviewed by the Operations Investment Team
 - All assets are visited and risk assessed by the one person. (Photos are taken where possible)
 - A risk rating is assigned to each asset

FMECA derived Risk Check List

| Electrical function | | Equipment | Safety | Enviro't |
|--|---|-----------|----------|----------|
| Transformer bushings / Cooling Fins / Transformer tapchanger / eye glass | Oil leaks / Near dwelling / Near Waterway | | | |
| Transformer | Noise outside kiosk / near dwellings | | | |
| Transformer Support bracket / Wheels / Transformer tank | Corrosion / Cracked / Broken / Positioning / Insufficient labeling / Evident of flashover / Overheating / Oil leaks | | | |
| Lighting | Defective / Missing | | | |
| HV link / RMIFS | Corrosion / Leaking / Insufficient labelling / Damaged | | | |
| LV panel | Corrosion / Damaged / Insufficient labelling / Loose / Asbestos exposed / Vermin damage / At height unreachable / Blocked | | | |
| Minimization of negative Impact | | Safety | Enviro't | |
| Oil containment | Missing / Inadequate / Cracked / Near waterway | 1 | 0 | |
| Ignitable materials in proximity | Near Tree / Overhanging branch / house / leaves / rubbish | 3 | 2 | |
| Public in proximity | Near school / park / church / pedestrian walkway / dwellings | 4 | | |

FMECA & Risk Assessment

Risk Score calculation & priority

- Total score = weighted sum of the risk rating
(weightings determined by the consequence of failure of each failure mode)
- Final priority reflects the urgency of replacement
in some locations the safety & environmental risks are the over-riding risk of the whole kiosk.

| Final adjusted score | Note | Total weighted score | Weights | Access | Tx Oil Leak | Tx Noise | Tx structure | Links/lig RMI | HV Panel | LV Link | Surg M | Cab | LV C | HV C | Earth | Oil | Ignita | Pu | |
|----------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------|---------|--------|-------------|----------|--------------|---------------|----------|---------|--------|-----|------|------|-------|-----|--------|----|---|
| 740 | Security - Serious Car Accident, par | 740 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| 400 | Safety - combination of leaking gel. | 118 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 400 | Safety - externally exposed earthing | 113 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Replacement Subprograms

- Risk Rated List of Assets
 - The assets are listed with their associated risk ratings or scores
 - These scores are sorted from highest to lowest
 - The order and scores are reviewed by a group of OIM team members as a sanity check
 - Priorities are allocated to the final list, with the highest priority for replacement being assigned to the number 1
- Replacement Plan 2009-14
 - \$1.49bn + Area Plan projects

FMECA and Asset acquisition

- Design FMECA is just the first step
- Eliminates failure modes in appropriate point in asset lifecycle
- Provides a view of the residual risk to be managed by operations / maintenance
- Provides a framework to capture asset performance.
 - maintenance reviews over lifecycle
 - feedback to designers

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FMECA and Asset acquisition

If FMECA tells us how the asset fails....

And RCM tells us how to manage the failure mode

Then.....

O&M manuals can be created to describe all tasks

- Training requirements can be determined

For a quantified analysis

- Task periods can be objectively determined
- Spare parts needs can be objectively determined

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FMECA in Action

Discussion

